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INTRODUCTION
The US Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and the Securities
and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) have brought more Foreign
On January 29, 2014, Fordham Law School and the Chinese Business Lawyers
Association jointly hosted a panel titled “China and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act:
Challenges for the 21st Century.” This Article was prepared for Mr. Gorman’s
presentation at the panel. For more information on the panel, visit http://
law.fordham.edu/newsroom/32206.htm.
Thomas O. Gorman is a Partner, resident in the Washington D.C. office of
Dorsey & Whitney, LLP. He is the co-chair of the firm’s Anticorruption and FCPA
practice group, the co-chair of the ABA White Collar Securities Fraud Subcommittee, a
former SEC enforcement official and publishes a blog which monitors and analyzes
SEC and DOJ securities enforcement trends, www.SECactions.com. His practice focuses
on securities enforcement and anticorruption issues and litigation and internal
investigations. He frequently lectures and publishes on securities enforcement
litigation topics. These materials were prepared for a presentation at “China and the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act” presented by Fordham Law School, January 29, 2014.
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Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) cases in recent years than
during any period since the passage of the statute in 1977.
Significant sums have been paid by business organizations to
resolve those actions. Corporate boards have been faced with
seemingly impossible choices regarding potential liability, selfreporting, cooperation, expansive and costly investigations, and
extensive remediation.
Recently the number of actions initiated has declined.
Nevertheless, any organization conducting business overseas is
immediately confronted with issues regarding FCPA compliance.
This is particularly true if business is being conducted in high
risk areas of the world such as China (“PRC”). There, local laws,
years old customs, and demands to partner with, or work
through, local organizations can make conducting business a
daunting process. Indeed, the company can quickly find itself in
the middle of a DOJ or SEC FCPA investigation tied to the
actions of local agents and affiliates.
Three key issues for business organizations with operations
in the PRC emerge in this context: 1) Is FCPA enforcement still
a priority; 2) What are critical current issues; and 3) What are
the key trends for the future? Each of these points will be
analyzed below.
I. IS FCPA ENFORCEMENT A CURRENT PRIORITY?
While FCPA enforcement has been an enforcement
priority, the number of actions brought has declined recently.
For example, the SEC reports that in 2013 it brought eight
FCPA actions. The prior year the agency brought ten actions,
while in 2011 and 2010 it brought fifteen in each year. 1 Trends
in criminal actions brought by the DOJ are similar. 2 Overall it is
clear that the number of cases being brought in recent years has
declined.
1. Spotlight on Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://
www.sec.gov/spotlingt/fcpa/fcpa-cases.shtml (last visited May 12, 2014).
2. See, e.g., Mark Jenkins et al., FCPA Compliance in China, FIDELITY FORENSICS
GROUP 3, http://www.fidelityforensics.com/wordpress/2013/10/18/fcpa-compliancechina (last visited May 12, 2014); Corporate FCPA Enforcement Was Down in 2013, Or Was
It Up, Or Was It Down?, FCPA PROFESSOR BLOG (Jan. 9, 2014), http://
www.fcpaprofessor.com/corporate-fcpa-enforcement-was-down-in-2013-or-was-it-up-orwas-it-down.
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In view of these statistics some may be lead to believe that
enforcement efforts have waned. Before reaching this
conclusion, however, two critical points should be considered:
1) The recent remarks of enforcement officials; and 2)
Significant recent cases. Together, these points suggest that
FCPA enforcement continues to be a key focus of enforcement
officials.
A. Remarks of Enforcement Officials
In recent remarks enforcement officials have stressed the
importance of FCPA enforcement, suggesting that efforts be
increased. For example, Acting DOJ Deputy AG Mythili Raman,
Chief, DOJ Criminal Division, recently called FCPA and anticorruption enforcement a “core priority of the Department of
Justice.” 3
To illustrate her point, Ms. Raman noted that since 2009
the DOJ has resolved over forty corporate corruption cases.
Those include nine of the top ten largest settlements in terms of
penalties in the history of the Act, resulting in about US$2.5
billion being paid in monetary fines. The DOJ is also
coordinating with officials from other countries.
Ms. Raman went on to note that last February the DOJ,
SEC, and FBI hosted what she called an “unprecedented”
meeting of “130 judges, prosecutors, investigators, and
regulators from more than thirty countries, multi-development
banks, and international organizations around the world.” The
purpose was for training and to exchange ideas for combating
foreign corruption. The conference also furthered specific
prosecutions.
Collectively these points illustrate the priority being given
to FCPA enforcement. Ms. Raman thus concluded her remarks
by calling for increased, not decreased, enforcement efforts,
stating that “I am certain that now is the time to enhance, not

3. Mythili Raman, Acting DOJ Deputy Att’y Gen., Chief, DOJ Criminal Division,
Keynote Address at the Global Anti-Corruption Congress, Washington, D.C. (June 17,
2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches/2013/crm-speech130617.html.
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diminish, our anti-corruption efforts. The fight against global
corruption is a critical mission . . . .”4
B. Significant Recent Cases
Examination of the FCPA actions brought in the last twelve
months confirms Ms. Raman’s comments. In the last twelve
months the DOJ and the SEC have teamed to bring three of the
largest FCPA cases in the history of the Act when measured by
the sums paid to resolve the actions.5 In May 2013 French oil
and gas giant Total, S.A. paid US$398 million to the DOJ and
the SEC to resolve FCPA charges and is now number four on the
top ten list. In November 2013 Swiss based Weatherford
International paid US$152 million to resolve FCPA charges and
is now number ten on the list. And, in January 2014 Alcoa, Inc.
paid US$384 million to settle DOJ and SEC FCPA charges,
putting the firm at number five. In addition, the Department of
Justice recently brought criminal FCPA charges against three
individuals. Collectively these actions suggest that FCPA
enforcement continues to be a priority. The cases are briefly
summarized below.
1. Total S.A.6
The actions involving Total stem from the efforts of the
company to re-enter the Iranian oil market. In 1995 Total
negotiated a development contract with the National Iranian Oil
Company (“NIOC”), a government instrumentality, for the
development of the Sirri A and E oil and gas fields. Prior to
executing the agreement, Total met with an Iranian Official who
had the ability to influence the award of the contract. The firm
and the official entered into a so-called consulting arrangement
which was used as a conduit for US$16 million in corrupt
payments over the next two and one half years.

4. Id. (emphasis added).
5. The Top Ten list is maintained by the FCPA blog and updated periodically. It is
available at www.fcpablog.com.
6. United States v. Total, S.A., Criminal No. 1:13 cr 239 (E.D. Va. Filed May 29,
2013); In re Total, S.A., Adm. Proc. File No. 3-15338 (filed May 29, 2013). The
discussion of the cases in the text is drawn from the court papers in these cases.
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In 1997 the company entered into a second arrangement
with NIOC. This agreement was to develop phases 2 and 3 of the
South Pars gas field, a joint venture with a number of other
multinational oil and gas companies. As with the initial project,
Total entered into a consulting arrangement with the Iranian
official. Over the next several years the company made a series
of payments under this agreement which totaled about US$44
million. None of the payments were properly recorded in the
books and records of the company.
Total resolved the criminal charges by entering into a
deferred prosecution agreement under which it paid a criminal
fine of US$245.2 million, retained a monitor for three years,
enhanced its compliance systems, and continued to cooperate
with enforcement officials. To resolve the SEC administrative
proceeding the company consented to the entry of a cease and
desist order based on Exchange Act sections 30A, 13(b)(2)(A),
and 13(b)(2)(B), and agreed to pay disgorgement of US$153
million and retain a consultant.
2. Weatherford International, Inc.7
Weatherford International Ltd. and its subsidiaries resolved
FCPA charges with the DOJ and SEC and also settled export
control charges, paying a total of US$252 million. The bribery
charges are based on three schemes. The first involved a joint
venture established by Weatherford subsidiary Weatherford
Services in Angola with two local entities in 2005. The two local
entities principals included foreign officials. The venture was
used solely as a conduit for millions of US dollars of payments by
the Weatherford subsidiary to the foreign officials controlling
them, according to the court papers. In exchange for the
payments, Weatherford Services obtained lucrative contracts and
information about the pricing of competitors.
The second scheme involved the bribery in Africa of a
foreign official by employees of Weatherford Services. The
7. United States v. Weatherford Services, Ltd., No. 13 CR 734 (S.D. Tex. filed Nov.
26, 2013); United States v. Weatherford International Ltd., No. 13 CR 733 (S.D. Tex.
filed Nov. 26, 2013); SEC v. Weatherford International, Ltd., Civil Action No. 4:13-CV03500 (S.D. Tex. filed Nov. 26, 2013). The discussion in the text is based on the court
papers filed in these actions. See also SEC Lit. Rel. No. 22880 (Nov. 26, 2013).
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purpose of the payments was to secure the renewal of an oil
services contract. The payments were made through a freight
forwarding agent. The payment made was concealed by the
creation of sham purchase orders and similar records crafted by
the forwarding agent. The contract was renewed in 2006.
The third scheme involved payments in the Middle East
from 2005 through 2011 by employees of Weatherford Oil Tools
Middle East Limited (“WOTME”). In this scheme what were
claimed to be volume discounts to a distributor who supplied
company products to a government owned national oil company
were actually used to create a slush fund. That fund was used to
make payments to the national oil company. During the period
WOTME paid about US$15 million to the distributor.
To resolve the FCPA charges with the DOJ, the company
entered into a deferred prosecution agreement. It required the
payment of an US$87.2 million criminal penalty and the
retention of a monitor for eighteen months. The underlying
criminal information contains one count of violating the
internal controls provisions of the FCPA. In addition,
Weatherford Services agreed to plead guilty to violating the antibribery provisions.
The SEC’s complaint alleged violations of Exchange Act
sections 30A, 13(b)(2)(A), and 13(b)(2)(B). To resolve the
charges the company agreed to pay US$90,984,844 in
disgorgement, prejudgment interest, and a US$1.875 million
civil penalty assessed in part for a lack of cooperation during the
investigation. US$31,646,907 of the payment will be satisfied by
the agreement of the company to pay an equal amount to the
USAO. 8
3. Alcoa, Inc.9
The DOJ and SEC FCPA actions involving the company
were against its majority-owned and controlled global alumina
8. In a separate matter, from 1998 through 2007, the company and certain
subsidiaries violated various US export control and sanctions laws. During the period
they exported or re-exported oil and gas drilling equipment to sanctioned countries
Cuba, Iran, Sudan and Syria. These charges were resolved with the payment of US$100
million, a deferred prosecution agreement and two guilty pleas.
9. United States v. Alcoa World Alumina LLC, No. 14-CR-00007-DWA (W.D. Pa.
January 9, 2014); In re Alcoa Inc., Adm. Proc. File No. 3-15673 (January 9, 2014)
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sales company and the parent, which is a public company based
in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Alcoa of Australia, a subsidiary of
Alcoa, secured a long term alumina supply agreement with
Aluminum Bahrain B.S.C. (“Alba”), an aluminum smelter
controlled by the government of Bahrain. Subsequently,
members of the Royal Family that controlled the tender process
had Alcoa of Australia insert a London based middleman into
the arrangement. As the relationship between Alcoa of Australia
expanded with the middleman, invoices with increasingly large
volumes of alumina were submitted through shell companies.
This permitted the consultant to pay bribes to certain
government officials.
In 2004 Alcoa World Alumina secured a long term alumina
supply agreement with Alba. It called for the sale of over 1.5
million metric tons of alumina to Alba through offshore shell
companies owned by the consultant. The consultant added
mark-ups to the price of the alumina totaling about US$188
million over a four year period beginning in 2005. Those markups were used to pay bribes. The payments were concealed
through false invoices. While officials at Alcoa reviewed certain
matters involved in these transactions, the SEC’s Order states
that there is “no findings that an officer, director or employee of
Alcoa knowingly engaged in the bribe scheme.”
To resolve the criminal case Alcoa World Alumina agreed
to plead guilty to one count of violating the anti-bribery
provisions of the FCPA. The firm also agreed to pay a US$209
million criminal fine and administratively forfeit US$14 million.
Alcoa, as part of the resolution, agreed to maintain and
implement an enhanced global anti-corruption compliance
program.
The SEC’s Order alleges violations of Exchange Act Section
30A(a), 30A(g), 13(b)(2)(A), and 13(b)(2)(B). To resolve the
proceeding the firm consented to the entry of a cease and desist
order based on Section 30A as well as the books and records and
internal controls sections. It also agreed to pay disgorgement of
US$175 million, a portion of which is deemed satisfied by the
payment of the forfeiture order in the criminal case to the
extent that obligation is paid. The total amount paid to resolve
the criminal and civil charges places Alcoa at number five on the
list of top ten FCPA cases by the amount paid.
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4. Individuals10
In November 2013 criminal FCPA charges against three
foreign nationals were announced by the Department of Justice.
At that time criminal complaints were filed against Knut
Hammarskjold and Joseph Sigelman, former co-CEOs of
PetroTiger. Each complaint contains one count of conspiracy to
commit wire fraud, one count of conspiracy to violate the FCPA,
three counts of FCPA violations and one count of money
laundering. The charges are based on a scheme executed by the
two men, along with the former general counsel of the
company, Gregory Weisman.
As part of the scheme three payments were made on behalf
of the company to an official at Columbia’s state-owned and
controlled oil company to secure a lucrative oil services contract.
Initially, the defendants tried to conceal the payments by
depositing them into the account of the official’s wife. When
that proved unsuccessful the payments were deposited into the
account of the official. The defendants are also alleged to have
attempted to secure kickback payments at the expense of
PetroTiger’s board members in connection with the negotiation
of an acquisition. Mr. Weisman pleaded guilty on November 8,
2013, to a criminal information charge of one count of
conspiracy to violate the FCPA and to commit fire fraud.11 The
actions were unsealed on January 6, 2014.
II. CRITICAL CURRENT ISSUES
Three critical, current issues for business organizations
center on self-reporting and cooperation, compliance, and
doing business in high risk environments such as the PRC.
A. Self-reporting and Cooperation
One of the most difficult issues business organizations face
is self-reporting and cooperation. It is a complex and difficult
decision which must be considered in the context of the fact
and circumstances of each situation, carefully assessing the
10. United States v. Hammarskjold, No. 13-2086 (D. N.J. filed Nov. 8, 2013);
United States v. Sigelman, No. 13-2087 (D.N.Y. filed Nov. 8, 2013)
11. United States v. Weisman, No. 1:13-CR-00730 (D.N.J. filed Nov. 8, 2013).
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pertinent facts, the legal obligations of the company, and the
impact of self-reporting and cooperation.
Enforcement officials are increasing the pressure on
companies to self-report and cooperate. This is illustrated by the
recent remarks of Deputy Attorney General James Cole and two
recent settlements. In his remarks Deputy AG Cole stressed the
importance of cooperation late last fall noting:
Because your role in the enforcement of the FCPA is vital to
its success, I want to assure you that we are committed to
demonstrating the benefits of your working cooperatively
with us. But, this does not mean that we will blindly accept
the conclusions of internal investigations. To the contrary,
we will continue to actively pursue our own investigations in
order to pressure test the results of your internal
investigations and be able to identify those companies that
are truly cooperating.12

Mr. Cole stressed that the cooperation must be genuine
and cautioned against what he called “gamesmanship,” that is,
creating the appearance of cooperation without actually
furnishing it. Self-reporting and cooperation might thus be
viewed as a balance where on the one side enforcement officials
are determined to hold those who violate the law accountable,
but on the other intend to reward self-reporting and
cooperation. Mr. Cole stressed that the choice belongs to each
individual firm.13
The actions involving Weatherford, previously discussed,
and Diebold, Inc. fortify these points. In Weatherford the
company was sanctioned for failing to cooperate with the
enforcement inquiries. In Diebold, the firm did in fact self-report
and cooperated but was criticized by enforcement officials for
what they claimed was inadequate remediation.14 These cases,
12. James Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., Address at the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
Conference, Washington, D.C. (Nov. 19, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/
opa/dag/speeches/2013/dag-speech-131119.html.
13. Id.
14. Diebold, Inc., Civil Action No. 1:13-cv-01609 (D.D.C. filed Oct. 22, 2013). The
actions centered on payments made through the subsidiaries of the company in China,
Indonesia and Russia from 2005 through 2010. In China, for example, there were
payments for travel, entertainment, and gifts to foreign officials through its subsidiary,
Diebold China. In addition, the subsidiary provided bank officials with cash gifts
ranging from less than US$100 to over US$600. Similar travel and entertainment
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along with Mr. Cole’s remarks, serve to highlight some of the
key questions surrounding the issue of self-reporting and
cooperation.
B. Compliance and Its Impact
Compliance is not a defense but it may be sufficient to earn
the firm a declination or at least a reduced penalty. Accordingly,
implementing appropriate compliance procedures may be
critical not just to avoid liability but, if necessary, mitigating it.
This is illustrated by the recent actions involving Morgan Stanley
employee Garth Peterson. There the firm received a declination
based on its compliance procedures. Mr. Peterson pleaded
guilty to a criminal charge.15
Garth Peterson was the head of Morgan Stanley’s Shanghai
office. The FCPA charges stem from his dealings with the former
Chairman of Yongye Enterprise (Group) Co., a Chinese state
owned entity involved in real estate. From 2004 through 2008
Morgan Stanley partnered with Yongye on a number of
significant Chinese real estate investments. At the same time Mr.
Peterson and the Chairman expanded their dealings in real
estate, secretly acquiring real estate from Morgan Stanley and
investing in other endeavors. Mr. Peterson did not disclose these
dealings to his firm as required.
In one transaction Mr. Peterson encouraged his firm to sell
an interest in Shanghai real estate to Yongye. Mr. Peterson
falsely represented that the purchaser was owned by the Chinese
company. In fact it was owned by Mr. Peterson, the Chairman,
expenses were paid for state officials by the other two subsidiaries. While there is no
claim that the parent company knew about the payments in Indonesia, in China a local
regulatory proceeding brought the matter to the attention of the parent as did the
discovery of payments by distributors in Russia. Nevertheless, the practices continued.
Diebold resolved the FCPA charges with the DOJ, agreeing to pay a US$25.2 million
penalty and entered into a three year deferred prosecution agreement to resolve
possible criminal charges. With the SEC, Diebold consented to the entry of a
permanent injunction prohibiting future violations of Exchange Act sections 30A,
13(b)(2)(A), and 13(b)(2)(B) and agreed to pay disgorgement and prejudgment
interest totaling US$22,972,942. Although the company self-reported and cooperated,
a monitor was installed under the deferred prosecution agreement and SEC settlement
for at least eighteen months.
15. United States v. Peterson, CR 12-224 (E.D.N.Y. filed Apr. 25, 2012); SEC v.
Peterson, Civil Action No. CV 12-2033 (E.D.N.Y. filed Apr. 25, 2012). The facts in the
text are drawn from the court papers in the proceedings.
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and a Canadian lawyer. Mr. Peterson thus negotiated for both
sides. He secured Morgan Stanley’s approval for the sale at a
discounted price. As a result of the deal the shell company had
an immediate profit of about US$2.5 million.
In 2006 Morgan Stanley negotiated at least five separate
Chinese real estate investments involving Yongye. Mr. Peterson
invited the Chinese official to invest along with Morgan Stanley
and its funds to reward him for what he had done for the firm
and further incentivize him. He set up an arrangement for
Morgan Stanley to sell the Chinese official a 3% interest in each
deal he brought to the firm for the cost of 2%. This gave the
official a discount of 1% which Mr. Peterson called a finder’s
fee. Mr. Peterson also promised the official an added return.
When Mr. Peterson disclosed this arrangement to his supervisors
he was warned of the FCPA bribery implications and told to
drop the arrangement. Nevertheless, Mr. Peterson paid the
official.
Mr. Peterson settled FCPA charges with the DOJ and the
SEC. In the criminal case he pleaded guilty to one count of
conspiracy to evade the company’s internal accounting controls
and was sentenced to serve nine months in prison followed by
three years of supervised release. Mr. Peterson also settled with
the SEC, whose complaint alleged violations of the bribery and
books and records and internal control provisions. He agreed to
the entry of an injunction and to pay disgorgement of
US$250,000. In addition, Mr. Peterson will relinquish his
interest in Shanghai real estate valued at about US$3.4 million
and he consented to be permanently barred from the securities
industry.
The company, in contrast, was not prosecuted in view of its
compliance procedures and cooperation. Both the DOJ and the
SEC acknowledged Morgan Stanley’s internal controls and
compliance procedures.16 According to enforcement officials,
16. The press release issued by the DOJ highlighted Morgan Stanley’s internal
compliance procedures:
Morgan Stanley maintained a system of internal controls meant to ensure
accountability for its assets and to prevent employees from offering,
promising or paying anything of value to foreign government officials.
Morgan Stanley’s internal policies which were updated regularly to reflect
regulatory developments and specific risks, prohibited bribery and addressed
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those policies were regularly updated to reflect regulatory
developments and specific risks and prohibited bribery. They
also addressed the corruption risks associated with giving gifts,
business entertainment, travel, lodging, meals, charitable
contributions, and employment. In addition, the procedures
provided for periodic training. The firm regularly monitored
transactions and required employees to disclose outside business
interests.
Mr. Peterson received FCPA training seven times and was
reminded to comply with the Act on thirty-five occasions. In one
instance the firm specifically told him that employees of Yongye
were government officials for FCPA purposes. He was also
furnished with written materials which he maintained in his
office. Periodically Morgan Stanley required Mr. Peterson to
certify compliance with the Act. Those certifications were
maintained as a part of his permanent record.
The DOJ concluded that Morgan Stanley’s internal policies
and procedures provided reasonable assurances that its
employees were not bribing government officials. In view of
those procedures, as well as the fact that the firm voluntarily
reported the matter and cooperated, the DOJ declined to
prosecute the firm. The SEC also acknowledged the cooperation
of Morgan Stanley.17
corruption risks associated with the giving of gifts, business entertainment,
travel, lodging, meals, charitable contributions and employment. Morgan
Stanley frequently trained its employees on its internal policies, the FCPA and
other anti-corruption laws. Between 2002 and 2008 Morgan Stanley trained
various groups of Asia-based personnel on the FCPA 54 times. During the
same period, Morgan Stanley trained Peterson on the FCPA seven times and
reminded him to comply with the FCPA at least 35 times. Morgan Stanley’s
compliance personnel regularly monitored transactions, randomly audited
particular employees, transactions and business units, and tested to identify
illicit payments. Moreover, Morgan Stanley conducted extensive due
diligence on all new business partners and imposed stringent controls on
payments to business partners.
US DOJ Press Release, Former Morgan Stanley Managing Director Pleads Guilty for
Role in Evading Internal Controls Required by FCPA (April 25, 2012), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/April/12-crm-534.html.
17. The FCPA cases involving Biomet Inc. are another example of potential
liability from alleged violations in the PRC and other countries being mitigated
through cooperation. Biomet Inc. is a global medical device company headquartered
in Warsaw, Indiana whose shares are listed on NASDAQ. The company, along with its
subsidiaries, made more than US$1.5 million in payments in violation of the FCPA
from 2000 to 2008 to publicly-employed health care providers in Argentina, Brazil, and

2014]

EMERGING TRENDS IN FCPA ENFORCEMENT

1205

C. Compliance—Basic Principles
Implementing a sound compliance system does not
necessarily require that the firm expend huge sums or purchase
every new product in the FCPA market place. What it does
require is that firms carefully and thoughtfully construct a
system based on key principles. Those principles were explicated
in the recently published DOJ/SEC Guide regarding the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.18 They require:
Tone at the top: “[C]ompliance begins with the board of
directors and senior executives setting the proper tone for
the rest of the company.”19 This requires more than a
good, well written program. Rather, it requires the
creation of a dynamic, strong culture which demands fair
play.
Code of conduct: The foundation of any set of procedures is
often the code of conduct. As the Guide states: The
policies and procedures of the organization should
“outline responsibilities for compliance within the
company, detail proper internal controls, auditing
practices, and documentation policies, and set forth
disciplinary procedures.”20 These can take a wide variety of
China. Biomet China made illegal payments through a distributor in China who
provided publicly-employed doctors with money and travel in exchange for purchases
with the knowledge of Biomet employees. The payments were falsely recorded in the
books and records of the company. The company resolved charges with the DOJ by
entering into a deferred prosecution agreement. Under the agreement the company
paid a criminal fine of US$17.28 million, implemented rigorous internal controls,
cooperated with the DOJ and retained a compliance monitor for eighteen months. The
DOJ acknowledged the extensive cooperation of the company which consisted of
“wide-reaching self-investigation . . . remedial efforts and compliance improvements.”
As a result the company received a reduced penalty. United States v. Biomet, Inc., Case
No. 1:12-cr-00080 (D.D.C. filed Mar. 26, 2012). Biomet also settled with the SEC,
consenting to the entry of a permanent injunction without admitting or denying the
allegations in the complaint, which prohibits future violations of Exchange Act sections
30A, 13(b)(2)(A), and 13(b)(2)(B). The company also agreed to pay disgorgement of
US$4,432,998 along with prejudgment interest and retain an independent compliance
consultant for eighteen months to review its FCPA compliance program. SEC v.
Biomet, Inc., Civil Action No. 1:12-cv-00454 (D.D.C. filed Mar. 26, 2012).
18. U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, A Resource Guide to the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Nov. 14, 2012) [hereinafter FCPA Resource Guide],
available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/guide.pdf.
19. Id. at 57.
20. Id. at 58.
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forms such as a web-based compliance program for the
approval of routine gifts, travel and entertainment.
Responsibility: Critical to any program is assigning
responsibility “for oversight and implementation of a
company’s compliance program to one or more specific
senior executives within the organization. Those
individuals must have appropriate authority within the
organization, adequate autonomy from management, and
sufficient resources . . .”21
Risk assessment: Fundamental to an effective compliance
program is risk assessment. One size does not fit all or even
every part of the organization. The approach and
procedures may differ across the organization depending
on the risk. As the Guide states: “Factors to consider, for
instance, include risks presented by: the country and
industry sector, the business opportunity, potential
business partners, level of involvement with governments,
amount of government regulation and oversight, and
exposure to customs and immigration in conducting
business affairs.”22
Training and updating: Compliance procedures must, to be
effective, be communicated throughout the organization
and periodically updated in view of experience. This can
be done in a variety of ways such as through web-based and
in-person training sessions. There should also be periodic
reviews and updates of the system based on the experience
of the organization and the dictates of the market place.
Incentives and disciplinary measures: The procedures must
apply to every person in the organization. Critical to this is
making integrity and ethics a part of the overall
promotion, compensation and evaluation process which
provides positive incentives for compliance. At the same
time, there must be an appropriate disciplinary scheme for
those who do not comply with the system.

21. Id. at 58.
22. Id. at 59.
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Third party due diligence: Agents, consultants, distributors
and other third parties have frequently been at the center
of FCPA actions. An effective set of procedures keyed to
risk based principles, an understanding of the business
rationale for using the third party and any payments and
on-going monitoring is key. Again, this is not a one-size fits
all approach but rather a program crafted to the dictates of
the market place and situation.
Confidential reporting: Finally, any program should have a
mechanism for confidential reporting. This can be used to
encourage employees to report questions to the
organization which should have a mechanism in place to
conduct the appropriate internal investigation and take
the proper steps.
D. Doing Business in the PRC
It is axiomatic that doing business in a high risk
environment such as the PRC presents certain challenges. The
reports regarding the current FCPA investigations into
JPMorgan regarding its so-called “sons and daughters” program
in which the children of prominent officials were retained is one
example.23 Another is the inquiry into the drug promotion
practices of Glaxo Smith Kline.24
A recent report by the US China Business Council, titled
Best Practices for Managing Compliance in China,25 based on a
survey of enterprises currently conducting business in China,
provides useful insight into current practices. It begins by

23. See, e.g., Ben Protess & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, On Defensive, JPMorgan Hired
China’s Elite, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 29, 2013, 9:22 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/
12/29/on-defensive-jpmorgan-hired-chinas-elite/; Protecting JPMorgan from China’s
Corruption, CNBC.COM (Dec. 21, 2013, 7:00 AM), www.cnbc.com/id/101302196/print;
Aruna Viswanatha & Emily Flitter, Exclusive: U.S. Expands China Hiring Probe to Morgan
Stanley, REUTERS (Nov. 26, 2013. 4:58 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/
26/us-china-jpmorgan-morganstanley-idUSBRE9AP19T20131126
24. See, e.g., Emily Flitter & Ben Hirschler, GlaxoSmithKline Under Investigation For
Allegedly Bribing Doctors In China, REUTERS (Sept. 6, 2013, 4:48 PM), available at http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/06/gsk-bribery_n_3882744.html.
25. U.S. China Bus. Council, Best Practices for Managing Compliance in China
(Oct. 2013), available at http://www.uschina.org/sites/default/files/USCBC%
20Compliance%20Report%202013.pdf
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recognizing the difficulty of conducting business in China while
maintaining an effective compliance program:
Foreign companies doing business in China encounter local
perspectives and assumptions that make adherence to
corporate compliance programs an ever evolving and
challenging effort. Practices normally considered
unacceptable in the U.S. may not only be allowed in China,
but may even be strongly encouraged by local cultural
conventions. Developing internal practices that take these
norms into consideration—while protecting a company’s
legal obligations and international reputation—is a difficult
process that requires balancing strongly competing
interests.26

Companies doing business in China must manage not just
FCPA compliance but also a variety of local laws while
competing with enterprises that are not focused on anticorruption compliance. China does not have any overriding
statute such as the FCPA, according to the Report. There are,
however, local laws which companies must consider including:
PRC criminal law; interpretations of select courts; anti-unfair
competition law; and certain interim provisions on prohibition
of commercial bribery activities.
While contending with these laws, and maintaining FCPA
compliance, business organizations must also compete with
those who are not following the US statute. About 60% of
companies reported in the survey that they are “more
concerned with competition from firms not following FCPA
strictures than with managing compliance program
enforcement in China.” Thus 35% of the companies surveyed by
the Business Council in a separate membership survey indicated
a loss of business due to FCPA compliance. Nevertheless, none
of the companies surveyed questioned the benefits of
compliance included protection from possible violations,
company branding in the market place, lower costs and a better
ability to manage local government expectations. Indeed, one
company reported an increase of 17% in profit margins after
winnowing its distributor relationships after conducting rigorous
FCPA due diligence.27
26. Id.
27. Id. at 6–7.
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The Business Council survey also provides insight into
compliance practices currently being utilized by companies
doing business in China. These include:
Structure: About 40% of the companies reported employing
full time compliance officers at the local level either covering
China or Asia-Pacific. A variety of reporting structures were used
including: 1) direct report to Asia-Pacific leadership with a
dotted line to China and US compliance heads; 2) Direct report
to US compliance with a dotted line to China leadership; and 3)
China compliance committee direct report to China leadership
with a dotted line reporting to the US compliance head.28
Local adoption: Over 90% of the companies surveyed
reported that compliance policies are developed by their global
teams and then implemented in specific regions. Nearly 60%
have China-specific rules built on global compliance principles.
Entertainment: One of the key risks faced by companies
stems from commercial and government entertainment. Ninetyfour percent of the firms responding in the survey reported
using mandatory monetary thresholds or limits on the amount
that can be spent on entertainment and gift giving. Forty-four
percent of those companies use global company wide limits in
US dollars while 56% keep the thresholds in local currency. The
average threshold for entertainment expenses in China is about
US$72 per event.
Gifts: Another key issue is gift giving, which is customary in
China. Most companies reported that they discourage gifts.
When they are unavoidable, typically firms favor giving gifts of
minimal monetary value with corporate logos such as flash
drives, calendars, notebooks, and small toys directly related to
the business of the company. Most companies also maintain a
threshold for gifts. The average amount for those in the survey
was US$57.29
Approval process: About 51% of those surveyed reported
setting pre-approval expense thresholds that are tailored to
various employee functions and levels. Only 16% of the

28. Id. at 10.
29. Id. at 13–15.
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responding companies reported having no pre-approval
process.30
Social responsibility activities: Most companies reported that
they do not participate in corporate social responsibility
initiatives. Companies that do participate prefer to work with
organizations that have an international track record or a global
agreement with the company.
Training: Those responding in the survey stressed frequent
and continuous training. Some companies tie training to yearly
reviews.31
Auditing: The most common method for monitoring
compliance is auditing. Approximately 44% of those responding
reported utilizing an external firm while 36% use internal
auditors and external firms.32
Whistleblowers: Nearly all of the companies in the survey
offer hotlines for staff to anonymously report compliance
concerns. The most successful are those with multi-lingual
support and local call-in numbers.
Joint ventures: These present some of the most challenging
issues, according to those who responded. Companies in the
survey stated that the most effective approach comes from
continual reinforcement over a long period. In view of the
cultural nuances of conducting business in China those
responding in the survey stated “it may be most effective to work
behind the scenes with key company leaders to win their support
for more stringent compliance observance.”33
IV. TRENDS FOR THE FUTURE
An analysis of current and past FCPA enforcement efforts
suggests four key trends for the future: A renewed emphasis on
individuals; an emphasis on cooperation and remedial efforts;
an approach to the statutes which requires a broader
understanding of regulatory trends; and whistleblowers.
Individuals: While in the past there have been a number of
actions brought against individuals, to a large extent the focus
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. at 16–17.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 21.
Id. at 22–23.
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has been on business organizations. Following the recent market
crisis there has been an increased emphasis on individual
accountability.
In the FCPA area, individual accountability has always been
difficult. Many of the cases involve either foreign corporations
or the overseas subsidiaries of US enterprises. As such,
frequently the individuals involved are not US citizens or
residents. This can make holding individuals accountable in US
courts difficult. The cases currently being litigated by the SEC
are a good illustration where in one instance the court
concluded that it had jurisdiction over an individual and in
another a motion to dismiss was granted based on a lack of
minimum contacts.34 At the same time the SEC is continuing
with those actions. And, the Department of Justice recently
announced criminal charges against three other individuals,
discussed earlier. In the current regulatory environment this
trend can be expected to continue.
Cooperation and remedial efforts: The remarks of Deputy
Attorney General Cole reiterated a long established policy of the
Department of Justice and the SEC regarding self-reporting and
cooperation. These have always been critical factors in FCPA
investigations.
The actions involving Weatherford and Diebold only serve
to underscore the critical nature of these issues. Weatherford
was fined for its lack of cooperation, not just denied cooperation
credit. Likewise, Diebold was cited for its incomplete
remediation despite having self-reported and cooperation. The
critical point is that earning cooperation credit in the future is
going to require real, substantial and perhaps extensive efforts.
Trends: To understand recent trends in FCPA enforcement,
it is critical to examine not just corruption actions but the
broader regulatory environment in which the DOJ and the SEC
make investigative and charging decisions. The SEC, for
example, is often at the outer edge of enforcement, opening
investigations on emerging issues. For example, when
34. SEC v. Straub, No. 11 Civ. 9645 (S.D.N.Y. Opinion issued Feb. 8, 2013)
(dismissing FCPA claims were individual did not have sufficient contacts with the
United States); SEC v. Sharef, No. 11 Civ. 907 (S.D.N.Y. Opinion issued Feb. 19, 2013)
(granting motion to dismiss where individual in FCPA case had sufficient contacts to to
the United States).
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Hollywood executives began making efforts to open the Chinese
markets for their product, it was the SEC that initiated inquiries
into those events.35 When firms had extensive dealings with
sovereign wealth funds again it was the SEC opening the
investigations.36
Other trends also emerge from the broader regulatory
environment. The sanctions imposed on Weatherford, for
example, might be considered novel in the FCPA context, but in
the past the SEC has imposed penalties on those who failed to
cooperate during their investigations. Likewise, some may have
considered the SEC’s action against Oracle Corporation37 for
FCPA books and records violations based on what was
characterized as a slush fund aggressive. Yet the Commission has

35. See, e.g., Aruna Viswanatha, Exclusive: SEC Probes Movie Studios over Dealings in
China, REUTERS (April 24, 2012, 6:14 PM) (“[The SEC] has sent letters of inquiry to at
least five movie studios in the past two months . . . .”); see also Edward Wyatt et al., S.E.C.
Asks if Hollywood Paid Bribes in China, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2012, http://
www.nytimes.com/2012/04/25/business/global/sec-asks-if-hollywood-paid-bribes-inchina.html; Michael White, Hollywood Moves on China No Matter What SEC Probe Finds,
BLOOMBERG (May 16, 2012, 8:55 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-05-17/
hollywood-moves-on-china-no-matter-what-sec-probe-finds.html.
36. See, e.g., Peter Lattman & Michael J. De La Merced, S.E.C. Looking Into Deals
With Sovereign Funds, N.Y. TIMES, (Jan. 13, 2011), available at http://
www.famegame.com/news/articleInfo?q=2194268; Peter J. Henning, For Wall Street,
Antibribery Inquiry Is Cause for Concern, N.Y TIMES (Jan. 18, 2011, 1:51 PM), http://
dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/01/18/for-wall-street-antibribery-inquiry-is-cause-forconcern/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0; Joshua Gallu, SEC Probes Financial Firms on
Sovereign Funds Bribes, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 14, 2011, 6:59 PM), http://
www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-01-14/sec-probes-financial-firms-on-possible-bribes-tosovereign-wealth-funds.html.
37. SEC v. Oracle Corporation, CV 12 4310 (N.D. Ca. filed Aug. 16, 2012) is a
settled FCPA action against the software company based on the actions of its subsidiary,
Oracle India Private Limited. Specifically, the complaint states that over a two year
period beginning in 2005, the subsidiary “parked” portions of the proceeds from
certain sales to the Indian government and “put the money to unauthorized use,
creating the potential for bribery or embezzlement.” Over a dozen transactions were
structured so that US$2.2 million could be held by distributors off the books of the
subsidiary. The money was then paid out to vendors, several of whom were mere store
fronts. The complaint alleges violations of Exchange Act Sections 13(b)(2)(A) and
13(b)(2)(B). The company settled the action, consenting to the entry of a permanent
injunction prohibiting future violations of the Sections cited in the complaint. It also
agreed to pay a US$2 million civil penalty. The settlement takes into account the fact
that Oracle voluntarily disclosed the matter, cooperated with the investigation, made
significant enhancements to its FCPA program, and terminated the employees
involved. See also Lit. Rel. No. 22450.
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taken other similar actions in the securities area.38 Accordingly,
in assessing regulatory trends it is critical to examine not just
how enforcement officials are administering the FCPA but also
the regulatory environment and the methods being utilized by
those officials.
Whistleblowers: Finally, while there has been much talk about
the SEC’s Dodd-Frank whistleblower program, there is perhaps a
more important trend in this area involving what might be
called corporate whistleblowers. Companies such as Siemens,
Johnson & Johnson, and others have expanded the notion of
corporate cooperation to include corporate whistleblowing.
Stated differently, to earn cooperation credit these firms and
others are developing information not just about their own
violations to furnish enforcement officials, but those of others.
Given the insight of these firms into the business area and
operations of their competitors, this type of information can be
expected to be most effective.39 This trend has the potential to
significantly impact FCPA enforcement as well as place
increased pressure on the decision to self-report, cooperate, and
conduct any necessary remediation.

38. See, e.g., In re Goldman, Sachs & Co., Adm. Proc. File No. 3-14845 (Apr. 12,
2012) (settled administrative proceeding which alleged the firm had inadequate
procedures to protect material non-public information because there was a serious risk
that type of information might be inappropriately shared by certain firm employees).
39. Thomas O. Gorman & William P. McGrath, Jr., The New Era of FCPA
Enforcement: Moving Toward a New Era of Compliance, 40 SEC. REG. L.J. 341, 350 (2012)
(discussing emerging trend of corporate whistleblowers seeking cooperation credit in
FCPA investigations).
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